Browser End-to-End Encryption
posted last month
LiveOverflow recently pushed a video about Nadim Kobeissi's last paper. It is quite informative and invite to the discussion: can an end-to-end encryption app served by a webserver be secure? If you haven't seen the video, go watch it. It gives a good explanation of something that is actually quite simple. Here's someone's opinion on unnecessary complicated papers:
“We use the standard Bellare-Rogaway definition of key exchange, which we briefly summarize below. [Fourteen pages of dense notation omitted] And in conclusion most Bluetooth devices use ‘000000’ as the hardcoded password.”— Matthew Green (@matthew_d_green) November 23, 2018
I have seen this kind of things happen quite often in the cryptography and security community. While some companies are 100% snake oils, some others do play on the border with their marketing claims but very real research. For example, advances in encrypted databases are mostly pushed by companies while attacks come from researchers not happy with their marketing claims. But this is a story for another time.
If you look at it from the other side, are mobile applications that more secure? While the threat model is not THAT different, in both of these solutions (thanks Nik Kinkel and Mason Hemmel for pointing that out to me) no specific targetting can happen. And this is probably a good argument if you're paranoia stops at this level (and you trust the app store, your OS, your hardware, etc.) Indeed, a webapp can easily target you, serving a different app depending on the client's IP, whereas mobile apps need the cooperation of the App store to do that. So you're one level deeper in your defense in depth.
What about Signal's "native" desktop application? Is it any better? Well... you're probably downloading it from their webserver anyway and you're probably updating the app frequently as well...